Du Plessis v. De Klerk: South Africa\u27s Bill of Rights and the Issue of Horizontal Application by Futch, Delisa
NORTH CAROLINA JOURNAL OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND
COMMERCIAL REGULATION
Volume 22 | Number 3 Article 7
Summer 1997
Du Plessis v. De Klerk: South Africa's Bill of Rights
and the Issue of Horizontal Application
Delisa Futch
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.unc.edu/ncilj
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by Carolina Law Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in North Carolina
Journal of International Law and Commercial Regulation by an authorized editor of Carolina Law Scholarship Repository. For more information,
please contact law_repository@unc.edu.
Recommended Citation
Delisa Futch, Du Plessis v. De Klerk: South Africa's Bill of Rights and the Issue of Horizontal Application, 22 N.C. J. Int'l L. & Com. Reg.
1009 (1996).
Available at: http://scholarship.law.unc.edu/ncilj/vol22/iss3/7
Du Plessis v. De Klerk: South Africa's Bill of Rights and the Issue of
Horizontal Application
Cover Page Footnote
International Law; Commercial Law; Law
This note is available in North Carolina Journal of International Law and Commercial Regulation: http://scholarship.law.unc.edu/
ncilj/vol22/iss3/7
NOTES
Du Plessis v. De Klerk:' South Africa's Bill of Rights
and the Issue of Horizontal Application
I. Introduction
On April 27, 1994, South Africans of all races went to the
polls to vote2 in the first national election that black South
Africans had ever had a voice.3 Nelson Mandela, their soldier of
freedom, won and formed the Government of National Unity.4 On
that same day the interim South African Constitution went into
effect,5 ensuring that these free elections would not be the last.6
Although "apartheid," a word which for so long triggered
notions of institutionalized, state-mandated oppression and racism,
now triggers only a memory, the memory is a lasting one. The
interim Constitution was written with the understanding that the
past would have to be remembered, but never be repeated.7
Virtually every chapter was imbued with remorse for the past,
I 1996 (5) BCLR 658 (CC), 1996 SACLR LEXIS 1 (May 15, 1996).
2 See Michael Higginbotham, The Price of Apartheid, 38 How. L.J. 371 (1995).
3 See id. at 376-77.
4 See Lisa M. Gonzalez, The Importance of Political Parties in South Africa, 20
FLETCHER F. WORLD AFF. 146, 147 (1996).
5 See S. AFR. CONST. (Constitution Act, 1993) ch. 15, § 251(1) [hereinafter
CONSTITUTION 1993]. The interim Constitution was adopted as a transitional
Constitution to provide for the governance of South Africa during a maximum five year
period of transition to full democracy, during which period an elected Constitutional
Assembly would draw up a permanent Constitution. See DION BASSON, SOUTH AFRICA'S
INTERIM CONSTITUTION: TEXT AND NOTEs 1 (1994) [hereinafter BASSON]. On May 8,
1996, the Constitutional Assembly adopted the Constitution of the Republic of South
Africa, 1996. See S. AFR. CONST. (Constitution Act, 1996) (Explanatory Memorandum)
[hereinafter CONSTITUTION 1996]. The new Constitution provides that it shall come into
effect "on a date set by the President by proclamation, but no later than 1 January 1997."
Id. § 244(1).
6 See CoNsTnroN 1993, supra note 5, § 40, schedule 2; see also DIoN
BASSON, SouTH AFRICA'S INTERIM CONSTM ON 1-2 (1994).
7 See CoNsTnrruIoN 1993, supra note 5, pmbl.
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desire for reconciliation in the present, and hope for a color-blind
South Africa in the future. Chapter 3 embodied South Africa's
first Bill of Rights.! To protect these rights the interim
Constitution provided for a Constitutional Court,9 which exercised
jurisdiction as the "court of final instance over all matters relating
to the interpretation, protection and enforcement of the provisions
of this Constitution."'" The Constitutional Court was established
to determine the scope of the rights afforded by the interim
Constitution and the manner in which they were to be enforced.
Fundamental to the issues of scope and enforcement was the
question of horizontal application of the Bill of Rights." As
defined by the Constitutional Court in Du Plessis v. De Klerk,
2
"[t]he term 'horizontal application' . . . indicates that those rights
also govern the relationships between individuals, and may be
invoked by them in their private law disputes," while "[t]he term
'vertical application' is used to indicate that the rights conferred
on persons by a bill of rights are intended only as a protection
against the legislative and executive power of the state in its
various manifestations."' 3 In general, conflicts over the horizontal
applicability of a bill of rights-as opposed to the vertical
applicability-frequently arise under constitutions that contain
bills of rights which do not expressly address the issue of
horizontal application.
4
8 See id. ch. 3 (South African Charter of Fundamental Rights).
9 See id. ch. 7, § 98(1).
'0 Id. ch. 7, § 98(2). The establishment of the Constitutional Court marked the
end of parliamentary sovereignty in South Africa. See Helen Suzman, Transformation
in South Africa: Cause and Effect, 32 STAN. J. INT'L L. 149, 154 (1996). Prior to April
27, 1994 an Act of Parliament could not be challenged for the constitutionality of its
substantive provisions; the judiciary could only examine an Act for compliance with the
constitutional procedures whereby the Act was passed. See BASSON, supra note 5, at 16-
17.
" See BASSON, supra note 5, at 15.
12 1996 (5) BCLR 658, 1996 SACLR LEXIS 1, at *34 (May 15, 1996).
13 Id.
14 Different countries have varied in their approaches to the horizontal
application of the bill of rights in their constitutions. See, e.g., Shelley v. Kraemer, 334
U.S. 1 (1948) (judicial enforcement of a racially restrictive covenant is state action
which would violate the Fourteenth Amendment); C.M. v. T.M. (1991) I.L.R.M. 268
(Irish court held that constitutional rights directly apply to a private dispute); Retail,
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After the interim Constitution went into effect, South Africa's
lower courts reached different conclusions on whether the Bill of
Rights was horizontally applicable. Although the Supreme Court
of the Transvaal Provincial Division had held that the Bill of
Rights was not horizontally applicable," the Bophuthatswana
Supreme Court had held that the Bill of Rights "[is] within certain
limits ... to be applied horizontally."' 6 Faced with non-uniform
treatment of the issue in the lower courts, the Constitutional Court
addressed and resolved the issue of horizontal application in Du
Plessis.
1 7
Part II of this Note sets out the facts and procedural posture of
the case and traces the Constitutional Court's reasoning for the
decision on appeal.'8 Part III focuses on the background law from
the various lower courts that struggled with the issue of horizontal
application of the Bill of Rights. 9 Part IV suggests reasons why
the Du Plessis opinion will prove significant under the new
Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 1996, the successor
to the interim Constitution that governed the Du Plessis decision."0
This part will also discuss the aspects of the Court's decision
which attempted to define the scope and enforceability of the
fundamental rights enshrined in Chapter 3." Part V concludes that
the issue of horizontal application of the Bill of Rights should be
revisited so that the Constitutional Court can clarify its own
jurisdictional scope and the role of the lower courts in applying the
Wholesale & Dep't Store Union, Local 580 v. Dolphin Delivery Ltd. (1987) 33 D.L.R.
(4th) 174 (holding by Canadian court that provisions of Canada's Charter could not be
invoked by parties to private litigation and that a court order did not constitute state
action); see generally Peter E. Quint, Free Speech and Private Law in German
Constitutional Theory, 48 MARYLAND L. REv. 247 (1989) (stating that rights afforded
by the German Basic Law do not override established rules of private law but rather
influence the development and interpretation of those rules).
'5 See Du Plessis v. De Klerk, 1994 (6) BCLR 124 (T).
16 Baloro v. Univ. of Bophuthatswana, 1995 (4) BCLR 197, 234 (SA).
17 See 1996 (5) BCLR 658 (CC), 1996 SACLR LEXIS I (May 15, 1996).
18 See infra notes 23-78 and accompanying text.
19 See infra notes 78-156 and accompanying text.
20 See infra notes 157-213 and accompanying text.
21 See infra notes 191-214 and accompanying text.
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Bill of Rights to private litigation.2
II. Statement of the Case
A. Facts
In February 1993 The Pretoria News, a daily newspaper, began
running a series of articles on the supply of arms to rebel forces in
Angola.2 ' The articles implied that certain South African citizens
were engaged in covert operations that were illegal under South
Africa's air control regulations. The covert flights were alleged
to be "illegal" and were characterized as "pirate flights."25 Two of
the articles mentioned the respondents in Du Plessis, Mr. Gert De
Klerk and his company, Wonder Air Ltd.26 The articles also
suggested that the persons conducting the flights were "fueling the
war in Angola" for personal gain.27 The March 9, 1993, article
named Mr. De Klerk as one of several private air operators
summoned by the Department of Foreign Affairs for questioning
in connection with the Angolan war.28
B. Procedure
The respondents (hereinafter "plaintiffs") instituted an action
for defamation29 in the Transvaal Provincial Division of the
22 See infra notes 215-27 and accompanying text.
23 See Du Plessis v. De Klerk, 1996 (5) BCLR 658 (CC), 1996 SACLR LEXIS 1,
at *25 (May 15, 1996).
24 See id. at *25-26.




29 The law of defamation in South Africa is undergoing development, apparently
in light of the interim Constitution. In 1993, the Appellate Division of the Supreme
Court held that South African law places the onus of proof on the defendant with regard
to both the defense of truth and the defense of qualified privilege. See Neethling v. Du
Preez, 1994 (1) SA 708 (A), 770. This burden derives from the presumption that arises
upon publication of the matter at issue that the defendant intended to inflict injury and
that the publication was unlawful. See id. at 768-69. In 1994, however, the
Witwatersrand Local Division of the Supreme Court held that, in light of section 15 of
the Constitution and due to the primacy of freedom of speech, the plaintiff's "private
interest must yield to the larger public one." Mandela v. Falati, 1994 (4) BCLR 1 (SA),
1012 [Vol. 22
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Supreme Court, claiming damages for injuries to their personal
reputation and for loss of business and injury to their commercial
reputation.3" The petitioners (hereinafter "defendants") responded
with a plea denying that the articles were defamatory and denying
any intention to implicate the plaintiffs in illegal activities." In the
alternative, the defendants argued that the articles expressed
opinions constituting "fair comment made in good faith on matters
of public interest"32 and that any facts contained in the articles
were true.33 The defendants also argued that the public had a right
to know the information published and that by publishing the
articles the Pretoria News had fulfilled its duty to keep the public
34informed concerning the Angolan civil war.
In October 1994, the defendants sought to amend their plea to
include their view that the publication of the articles was not
unlawful because they were protected by section 15 of the
Constitution of the Republic of South Africa.3 ' The plaintiffs
objected to the proposed amendment on the grounds that: (1) the
publication of the articles and the resulting damages occurred prior
to the effective date of the interim Constitution, which did not
operate retrospectively,36 and (2) the interim Constitution had no
horizontal application.37 The Supreme Court agreed that the
interim Constitution did not operate retrospectively and ruled that
the defendants could not invoke any of its provisions.3" The court
also held that the Bill of Rights had only vertical application. As a
1994 SACLR LEXIS 290, at *22-25 (Sept. 8, 1994) (denying an injunction to prevent
the publication of allegedly defamatory material).
30 See Du Plessis v. De Klerk, 1996 (5) BCLR 658 (CC), 1996 SACLR LEXIS 1,




34 See id. at *28.
35 See id. at *29. Section 15 provides in pertinent part that "[e]very person shall
have the right to freedom of speech and expression, which shall include freedom of the
press and other media." CONSTITUTION 1993, supra note 5, ch. 3, sec. 15(1).
36 See Du Plessis v. De Klerk, 1996 (5) BCLR 658 (CC), 1996 SACLR LEXIS 1,
at *31 (May 15, 1996).
37 See id.
38 See id. at *33.
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result of this ruling, the defendants could not invoke section 15 as
a defense in a civil action." Upon the defendants' application for
leave to appeal, the Supreme Court referred the issues of
retrospective application and horizontal application to the
Constitutional Court for a final determination.4 In June 1995, the
Constitutional Court granted the defendants leave to appeal from
the Supreme Court's decision."
C. The Constitutional Court
1. Retrospective Application
Although the bulk of the Court's opinion in Du Plessis
concerned the issue of horizontal application of the Bill of Rights,
the Court first dealt with the issue of the retrospective application
of the Interim Constitution.42 The Court recognized that lower
courts differed on this issue,43 but nevertheless felt that its prior
decisions "made clear that the Constitution did not affect acts
performed before its commencement."" The Court conceded that
the Constitution permitted the Court discretion to antedate an
order of invalidity;4 however, it noted that any such order would
be retroactive only as to the date of the order and would not be
retroactive with respect to the applicability of the Interim
Constitution.4" The Court also rejected the defendant's argument
39 See id. at *35.
40 See id.
41 See id. at *36.
42 See id. at *38.
43 See id.
44 Id. at *40 (citing S. v. Mhlungu, 1995 (3) SA 867 (CC)). The Court in
Mhlungu declared unconstitutional the use in a criminal action of the presumption
included in section 217(l)(b)(ii) of the Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977. See id. at
*39. The Court also distinguished Mhlungu on the basis that the procedural actions yet
to be taken were unconstitutional; in Du Plessis the pertinent actions had already
occurred prior to the effective date of the Constitution. See id. at *38-40.
'5 See id. at *42 (citing S. v. Mhlungu, 1995 (3) SA 867 (CC)); see also
CONSTITuTrON 1993, supra note 5, ch. 7, § 98.
4 Section 98 provides:
Unless the Constitutional Court in the interests of justice and good government
orders otherwise, and save to the extent that it so orders, the declaration of
1014 [Vol. 22
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that they should be able to avoid liability for their actions even
though any order of invalidity at the date of the decision could not
render their actions lawful.47 Finally, the Court held that the
defendants could not invoke section 15 and dismissed their
appeal.4"
2. Horizontal Application
Despite its holding that the defendants' appeal must be
dismissed because the Bill of Rights did not apply retroactively,
the Court addressed the issue of whether the Bill of Rights was
horizontally applicable. 49 The Court reiterated the lower court's
reasoning that the primary purpose of the Bill of Rights was to
combat abuses of state power" and noted that the lower court had
invalidity of a law or a provision thereof--a) existing at the commencement of
this Constitution, shall not invalidate anything done or permitted in terms
thereof before the coming into effect of such declaration of invalidity ....
CONSTITUTION 1993, supra note 5, ch. 7, § 98(6).
47 See Du Plessis, 1996 SACLR LEXIS 1, at *45-48. In making this argument,
the defendants relied on S. v. Makwanyane, 1995 (6) BCLR 665 (CC), 1995 SACLR
LEXIS 218, at *128 (June 6, 1995), where the Court declared the death penalty
unconstitutional because of section 11(2) (right to life). See Du Plessis, 1996 SACLR
LEXIS 1, at *45-48. The Court distinguished Makwanyane on the grounds that the
State had no accrued right to execute the defendant, whereas the plaintiffs in Du Plessis
had an incorporeal property right to damages which accrued from the moment the
defamatory material was published. See id. at *45.
4 See id at *43. The Court's reasoning seems to indicate that the competing
interest of the plaintiffs in Du Plessis forms the basis of their holding; however, the
Court was cognizant of the fact that another case may present more compelling
circumstances in which the competing interests of the other party may not preclude ante-
dating an order of invalidity. See id. at *49. The Court, therefore, "[left] open the
possibility that there may be cases where the enforcement of previously acquired rights
would in the light of our present constitutional values be so grossly unjust and abhorrent
that it could not be countenanced .... " Id.
49 See CONSTITUTloN 1993, supra note 5, ch. 7, § 102(8). Section 102 provides
that constitutional issues may be referred to the Court "[i]f any division of the Supreme
Court disposes of a matter in which a constitutional issue has been raised and such court
is of the opinion that the constitutional issue is of such public impoitance that a ruling
should be given thereon... ." Id. Given this provision, which allows the Constitutional
Court to decide constitutional issues even though a case has already'been disposed of,
the Court's decision regarding horizontal application should not be considered dicta.
50 See Du Plessis v. De Klerk, 1996 BCLR 658 (CC), 1996 SACLR LEXIS 1, at
*60 (May 15, 1996). The lower court arrived at this conclusion based on the historical
context which gave rise to the Bill of Rights and a comparative review of constitutional
jurisprudence. See Du Plessis v. De Klerk, 1994 (6) BCLR 124 (T). For a brief
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emphasized that uncertainty would be injected into private
relationships as a result of any wide application of the Bill of
Rights to private legal relationships. 1
The Court then undertook a survey of foreign case law52 and
concluded that "there is no universal answer to the problem of
vertical or horizontal application of a bill of rights."53  After
analyzing case law from the United States, Canada, and Germany,
the Court expressed comparative approval of the German model of
"indirect" horizontal application.1
4
After undertaking this survey of international law, the Court
reasoned that the "plain answer" issues involved in Du Plessis
could be resolved by a proper reading of the Constitution.5 The
Court reformulated the issue of horizontal applicability into two
distinct questions. First, "[t]o what law [does] the Chapter appl[y].
discussion of the current trend worldwide to apply bills of rights horizontally despite
recognition of the primary purpose of such bills as protection against state abuses, see
LouRENs Du PLESSIS AND HUGH CORDER, UNDERSTANDING SOUTH AFRICA'S
TRANSITIONAL BILL OF RIGHTS 113 (1994).
51 See Du Plessis v. De Klerk, 1996(5) BCLR 658 (CC), 1996 SACLR LEXIS 1,
at *62 (May 15, 1996).
52 Since the interim Constitution only came into force in 1994, South African
courts had little indigenous constitutional jurisprudence on which to rely. The interim
Constitution provided, however, that when interpreting provisions of the Bill of Rights,
a court "may have regard to comparable foreign case law." CONSTITUTION 1993, supra
note 5, ch. 3, § 35 (1).
53 Du Plessis, 1996 SACLR LEXIS I, at *63.
54 See id. at *73-74. The Court emphasized that the German Constitutional
Court, like the South African Constitutional Court, has jurisdiction only over
constitutional issues. See id. at *73. This jurisdictional similarity to the German
Constitutional Court rendered its approach more attractive than that of the United States
Supreme Court. See id. Additionally, the Court believed that "in some cases the impact
of the German Basic Law upon private law under the 'indirect' doctrine may be stronger
than that of the United States Constitution." Id. See also supra note 14 (citing foreign
cases the Court examined in its analysis).
The German model of "indirect horizontal application" may best be understood in
terms of the German notion that the basic rights in the German Basic Law "not only
establish subjective individual rights, but an objective order of values or an objective
value system." Du Plessis, 1996 SACLR LEXIS 1, at *143 (Mahomed, J., concurring).
When legal rules are unclear, they must be given the interpretation which conforms to
the objective value'system. There is only a violation of the basic rights if the court fails
to interpret the law in light of this system. See id. at *153 (Mahomed, J., concurring).
11 Du Plessis, 1996 SACLR LEXIS 1, at *77.
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Does it apply to the common law or only to statute law?"56 Second,
"[w]hat persons are bound by the Chapter. Do the rights give
protection only against governmental action or can they also be
invoked against private individuals?"57 With respect to the first
question, the Court found the answer in section 7(2) of the Interim
Constitution, which applied the provisions of Chapter 3 to "all law
in force."58 While admitting that the term "all law in force" was
ambiguous, the Court resolved the ambiguity by referring to the
Afrikaans text of the Constitution." In the Afrikaans version of
the text the word "reg," a word whose definition included common
law as well as statutory law,60 was used for "law.",6' Based on this
interpretation, the Court decided that the provisions of Chapter 3
applied to the common law and that "governmental acts or
omissions in reliance on the common law may be attacked by a
private litigant as being inconsistent with Chapter 3 in any dispute
with an organ of government." 62
On the second question, which entities were bound by Chapter
3, the Court looked to section 7(1) to reach its decision.63  The
Court reasoned that any provision allowing horizontal application
could have, and presumably would have, been made in expressly
clear terms, and held that private entities were not directly bound
by Chapter 3 .6' The Court found support for its conclusion in
56 Id.
57 Id.
58 Id. Section 7(2) provides: "This Chapter shall apply to all law in force and all
administrative decisions taken and acts performed during the period of operation of this
Constitution." CoNsTITUTIoN 1993, supra note 5, ch. 3, § 7(2).
19 Du Plessis, 1996 SACLR LEXIS 1, at *78. The English version of the
Constitution is deemed to be the signed version and is, therefore, the prevailing version
in case of conflicts between the texts. See id. The Court, however, found that since
there was merely ambiguity in the English text-rather than actual conflict between the
two texts--the Afrikaans text could be referred to, giving preference to the unambiguous
meaning that text contained. See id.
60 See id.
61 See id.
62 Id. at *85-86.
63 See id. at *78. Section 7(1) provides that the chapter "shall bind all legislative
and executive organs of state at all levels of government." CONSTITUTION 1993, supra
note 5, ch. 3, § 7(1).
6 See Du Plessis, 1996 SACLR LEXIS 1, at *80. The Court quoted the express
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section 33(4), which provided that Chapter 3 "shall not preclude
measures designed to prohibit unfair discrimination by bodies and
persons other than those bound in terms of section 7(l). "65 The
Court reasoned that there would be no legal entity or person left to
whom this provision would apply if Chapter 3 were construed to
apply horizontally.66 Likewise, the Court reasoned that section
35(3) would be rendered superfluous by a construction of Chapter
3 that permitted direct horizontal application of its provisions.67
Additionally, the Court noted that the absence of any reference
to the judiciary in section 7(1), the section that set out the branches
of government that were bound by the interim Constitution, was
instructive in reaching its decision.6 ' The Court assumed that the
omission was purposeful and that the wording was meant to avoid
the "state action" doctrine resorted to by United States courts."
The Court held that only legislative and executive organs would be
directly bound by the Bill of Rights.7"
The Court proceeded to support this holding, in the context of
its limited jurisdiction, based on the language of section 98. 7 ,
provision regarding direct horizontal application in Article 5 of the Namibian
Constitution:
The fundamental rights and freedoms enshrined in this Chapter shall be
respected and upheld by the Executive, Legislative and Judiciary and all organs
of the Government and its agencies and, where applicable to them, by all
natural and legal persons in Namibia, and shall be enforceable by the Courts in
the manner hereinafter prescribed.
Id. at *80-81.
It has been suggested that reference to horizontal application was omitted from the
interim Constitution as part of a compromise among the parties negotiating the
document. See DU PLESSIS & CORDER, supra note 50, at 112-13 (1994).
65 CONSTITuION 1993, supra note 5, ch. 3, § 7(1).
1 See Du Plessis v. De Klerk, 1996 (5) BCLR 658 (CC),1996 SACLR LEXIS 1,
at *81 (May 15, 1996).
67 See id. at *82. Section 35(3) requires that a court, when interpreting common
law, "have due regard to the spirit, purport and objects of [Chapter 3]." BASSON, supra
note 5, at 56.
68 See Du Plessis, 1996 SACLR LEXIS 1, at *82.
69 See id.
70 See id. at *84.
71 See id. at *88-109. Section 98 sets forth the jurisdictional parameters of the
Constitutional Court:
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Turning again to the word "reg" in the Afrikaans text, the Court
noted the distinction between "reg," which meant common law
and statutory law, and "wet," which meant "statute law.""2
Because the Constitutional Court's jurisdiction only extended to
"wet" as opposed to "reg" under section 98, a horizontal
application of Chapter 3 would allow appeals to the Constitutional
Court from judgments which the Court would not be competent to
review.73 Additionally, the Constitutional Court reasoned that
striking down a portion of the common law would leave gaps in
the law and require the reformulation of the common law, a duty
which it felt properly fell within the jurisdiction of the Appellate
Division of the Supreme Court.
74
The Court then reviewed the provisions in the Bill of Rights
which bolstered its finding that the Appellate Division retained the
function of developing the common law.75 Because section 35(3)
provided that courts must give due regard to the spirit of the Bill
of Rights, adequate provisions were made in the interim
Constitution for the development of the common law while
ensuring the fundamental rights guaranteed in the Constitution
were protected.76 The Court's endorsement of the "indirect
(2) The Constitutional Court shall have jurisdiction in the Republic as the court
of final instance over all matters relating to the interpretation, protection and
enforcement of the provisions of this Constitution, including... (b) any dispute
over the constitutionality of any executive or administrative act or conduct or
threatened executive or administrative act or conduct of any organ of state; ...
(5) In the event of the Constitutional Court finding that any law or any
provision thereof is inconsistent with this Constitution, it shall declare such law
or provision invalid to the extent of its inconsistency: Provided that the
Constitutional Court may, in the interests of justice and good government,
require Parliament or any other competent authority, within a period specified
by the Court to correct the defect in the law or provision, which shall then
remain in force pending correction or the expiration of the period so specified.
CONSTITUTION 1993, supra note 5, ch. 7, § 98.
72 See Du Plessis v. De Klerk, 1996 (5) BCLR 658 (CC), SACLR LEXIS 1, at
*88 (May 15, 1996).
73 See id. at *89-91.
74 See id. The Court further noted that the "radical amelioration" of the common
law is the function of Parliament. Id. at *91.
75 See id. at * 103-04.
76 See id.
1997] 1019
N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG.
horizontality" model in German law" resulted in part from the
Court's view that the German and South African constitutions
both provided a division of constitutional jurisdiction between
different appellate courts, depending on the issue presented for
review.7"
III. Background Law
By the time Du Plessis reached the Constitutional Court, four
lower courts, in five separate cases, had addressed the issue of
horizontal application and concluded that parties could invoke the
protection of the Bill of Rights in private litigation.79 Although
these four courts concluded that at least some provisions of the
Bill of Rights were capable of direct horizontal application, they
reached this conclusion in different ways.
In Mandela v. Falati,° the Witwatersrand Division of the
Supreme Court addressed the issue of horizontal application in the
context of whether an injunction to bar the publication of allegedly
defamatory material was permissible.8 Although the opinion was
unclear as to the exact content of the allegedly defamatory
statements, they apparently concerned the applicant's prior
conviction of assault and kidnapping." The respondent, the
77 See supra note 54 for a description of the German model of "indirect
horizontal application."
78 See Du Plessis, 1996 SACLR LEXIS 1, at * 104.
79 See Mandela v. Falati, 1994 (4) BCLR I (W), 1994 SACLR LEXIS 290, at
* 16 (Sept. 8, 1994); Gardener v. Whitaker, 1994 (5) BCLR 19 (E), 1994 SACLR LEXIS
284, at *35 (Nov. 11, 1994); Holomisa v. Argus Newspapers Ltd., 1996 (2) SA 588,
598; Motala v. Univ. of Natal, 1995 (3) BCLR 374 (D), 1995 SACLR LEXIS 256 (Feb.
24, 1995); Baloro v. Univ. of Bophuthatswana, 1995 (4) SA 197 (A), 226-28. The
Supreme Court of South Africa is divided into an Appellate Division and provincial and
local divisions. See BASSON, supra note 5, at 149-50. Appeals may be taken from the
lower courts to the Appellate Division where issues of law may be finally determined.
See id. at 151. Constitutional issues are appealed only to the Constitutional Court. See
id. at 150. But see De Klerk v. Du Plessis, 1994 (6) BCLR 124 (T); Potgieter v. Kilian,
1995 (11) BCLR 1498 (N), 1995 SACLR LEXIS 272 (Oct. 6, 1995) (the Natal Division
of the Supreme Court was the only appellate court that followed the lower Du Plessis
decision and held the Bill of Rights only capable of vertical application).
80 1994 (4) BCLR I (W), 1994 SACLR LEXIS 290.
81 See id. at *9.
82 See id. at *1-3.
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applicant's co-defendant at a prior trial, argued that under South
African law a party must establish a "clear case" in order to obtain
injunctive relief and that the plaintiff could not carry the burden of
establishing that the defendant did not have a valid defense to the
defamation suit.83 It seems, although it is not clear from the
opinion, that the reason the plaintiff could not prove the lack of a
defense revolved around the potential for a defense based on
section 15 of the Bill of Rights."'
Faced with the issue of a possible defense based on section 15,
the Falati Court addressed the broader issue of the horizontal
application of the Bill of Rights.85 After first looking at the
Constitution's supremacy clause,86 the court turned to section 7(2)7
and determined that the reference to "all law in force"
encompassed the common law.8 The court found it particularly
significant that the section included the judiciary as an entity
bound by the Constitution. 9 After noting that section 790 contained
language similar to section 4's, the court found that these sections
implicitly supported the direct horizontal application of the Bill of
Rights.!'
The court then assessed the nature of the right to freedom of
speech in terms of the framers' intentions when drafting the Bill of
Rights92 and noted that section 33 required a heightened standard
83 See id. at * 15.
84 See id. See also supra notes 29, 35.
85 See Mandela v. Falati, 1994 (4) BCLR 1 (W), 1994 SACLR LEXIS 290, at
*15 (Sept. 8, 1994).
86 Section 4 provides:
(1) The Constitution shall be the supreme law of the Republic and any law or
act inconsistent with its provisions shall ... be of no force and effect to the
extent of the inconsistency. (2) This Constitution shall bind all legislative,
executive and judicial organs of state at all levels of government.
CONSTITUTION 1993, supra note 5, ch. 1, § 4.
87 See supra note 58.
88 Mandela v. Falati, 1994 (4) BCLR 1 (W), 1994 SACLR LEXIS 290, at *16
(Sept. 8, 1994).
89 See id.
90 See supra notes 58, 63, 86.
91 See Falati, 1994 SACLR LEXIS 290, at * 15-17.
92 Chapter 3 of the interim Constitution contains the South African Bill of
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when scrutinizing limitations of free speech relating to political
activity.93 Because political activity occurred between private
citizens as well as between citizens and the government, 4 the court
reasoned that "[t]he drafters of the Constitution must therefore
have envisaged that the rights necessary to conduct such activity
could be enforced as between individuals. 95
The Witwatersrand Division faced the issue of horizontal
application a second time in Holomisa v. Argus Newspapers."
Once again the dispute involved section 15's guarantee of the right
to freedom of speech and press in the context of a defamation
suit.97 The plaintiff was a public official98 who alleged that the
defendant newspaper had defamed him by printing a report
wrongly connecting him to a hit squad that had infiltrated South
Africa as part of a plan to assassinate a government official." The
court in Holomisa, as had the Gardener court, took a purposive
approach1°° to the individual provisions of the Bill of Rights. °1
Some provisions the court deemed could not have been intended to
apply as between "legal strangers.""1 2 However, the court felt that
the values of the Constitution must "inform every aspect of legal
reason and decision-making,""1 3 with the result that some
provisions of the Bill of Rights necessitated changes in the
Rights.
93 See Falati, 1994 SACLR LEXIS 290, at *17-18 (citing section 33(l)(bb)).
Rights may be limited by laws of general application, but such limitations must be
"necessary" with respect to, inter alia, section 15, "in so far as such right relates to free
and fair political activity." BASSON, supra note 5, at 48.
94 See Falati, 1994 SACLR LEXIS 290, at * 17.
91 Id. at "18.
96 1996 (2) SA 588.
97 See id.
98 See id. at 593 (plaintiff was a military ruler of Transkei).
99 See id.
100 A purposive approach is one "which gives optimal effect to the objects and
ideals of constitutionalism enshrined in the Constitution and in the Bill of Rights." DU
PLESSIS & CORDER, supra note 50, at 85. Such an approach "is predicated upon the
purpose of the right, with the result being that the widest possible interpretation will not
inevitably be the one which will be supported." BASSON, supra note 5, at 56.
1o See Holomisa v. Argus Newspapers Ltd., 1996 (2) SA 588, 597.
102 Id. at 596-97.
103 Id. at 598.
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common law.'O° The court ultimately found that section 15 was
such a provision."
This decision was also influenced by policy considerations.,
The Holomisa Court stated that the Constitution's success
depended on "robust criticism of the exercise of power" and that
the media must play a crucial role in the dissemination of such
criticism.17 Considering the media "an indispensible adjunct to
free and fair political activity,"'0 8 the court determined that the
preference given to protection of individual reputation over
freedom of expression was irreconcilable with the purpose of the
interim Constitution."' The court also noted that South African
politicians had historically used the law of defamation to stifle
criticism." Because of the perceived unreasonable weight given
to the protection of an individual's reputation at common law and
the history of its abuse, the court reformulated the law of
defamation."' After Holomisa, the law of defamation in the
Witwatersrand Division required a plaintiff to show that a
statement in the context of political activity was "unreasonably
made" even if the statement was false."'
A few months later the Eastern Cape Division of the Supreme
Court faced the issue of the horizontal application of section 15 in
Gardener v. Whitaker."' The case involved a defamation suit in
which the plaintiff, a town clerk, sought to hold the defendant, a
city councillor, liable for suggesting in a committee meeting that
the plaintiff was a liar."4 Before concluding that section 15
protected the speech in question, the court examined sections 7,
l04 See id. at 601-08.
105 See id.
106 See id. at 614.
107 Id. at 609.
108 Id. at 614.
109 See id. at 611.
110 See id. at 614.
"' See id. at618.
112 Id.
113 1994 BCLR 19 (E), 1994 SACLR LEXIS 284 (Nov. 11, 1994).
114 See id. at *13-19.
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33, and 35 of the Constitution. "5 The court took notice of the use
of the word "reg" for the word "law ' in each of these sections
and concluded that these sections applied to private actions under
the common law as well as the public law. "7
The court then surveyed foreign law and determined that in
Canada, the United States, and Germany that the primary purpose
of a bill of rights was to safeguard individual rights against
unjustified intrusion by the State."8 Nevertheless, the court also
identified in each body of law "an apparent need to ensure that the
values inherent in the charters should permeate throughout the
entire legal system."" 9 After defining the overall purpose of the
Constitution, the court focused on the individual right at issue'
and the law of defamation.'2' The Court observed that South
Africa's defamation law had historically placed greater weight on
protecting a person's reputation than on protecting free speech,
even when the speech concerned matters of public interest."
Because the Bill of Rights had not set out a hierarchy of rights, the
protection of reputation conflicted with the Constitution to a
greater extent than the competing right to freedom of speech.'23
Faced with these competing rights, the court determined that the
law should not favor one over the other.2 4 For this reason, the
court reallocated the burdens in the law of defamation in order to
harmonize the law with the balance it felt must be struck in regard
to the competing interests protected by the Bill of Rights.'25
In contrast to the cases which faced the issue of horizontal
115 See id. at *27-30; see supra notes 58, 63, 67, 89.
"6 See Gardener, 1994 SACLR LEXIS 284, at *29; see also supra note 72 and
accompanying text.
117 See Gardener, 1994 SACLR LEXIS 284, at *29.
"I See id. at *34-35.
119 Id. at *35.
120 See id. at *38-39.
121 See id. at *41-42; see supra note 29.
122 See Gardener, 1994 SACLR LEXIS 284, at *54 (noting the common law rules
which place the burden of proof on the defendant); see supra note 29.
123 See Gardener, 1994 SACLR LEXIS 284, at *55.
124 See id. at *56-58.
125 See id. at *57-59.
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application with respect to speech protected by section 15, Motala
v. University of Natal'26 presented the Durban and Coast Local
Division of the Supreme Court with a challenge to a university's
admissions policy.' 7  The policies in question instituted an
affirmative action program that contained a quota for the
admission of Indian students to the medical school at the
University of Natal'28 and a non-uniform system for reviewing
applicants.'29 The plaintiff in the case argued that such a system
constituted unfair discrimination in violation of sections 8 and 32
of the Bill of Rights.1
30
The court stated that the central issue was whether the
provisions in question applied between the parties. 13' After briefly
considering the arguments on both sides of the horizontal
applicability issue, the court held that sections 8 and 32 could be
horizontally applied.' The court refused to apply the principle of
expressio unius exclusio alterius33 to section 7(1) to infer that the
absence of reference to the judiciary in that section excluded the
judiciary from being bound by section 7.134 Rather, the court read
these constitutional provisions in combination'35 and determined
that one of the main purposes of the Constitution was
126 1995 (3) BCLR 374 (D), 1995 SACLR LEXIS 256 (Feb. 24, 1995).
127 See id.
128 See id. at *14-15. The quota was set at 40. See id.
129 See id. at *15-17.
130 See id. at *20. Section 8 provides in part that "no person shall be unfairly
discriminated against, directly or indirectly, and without derogating from the generality
of this provision, on one or more of the following grounds in particular: race, gender,
sex, ethnic or social origin, colour, sexual orientation, age, disability, religion,
conscience, belief, culture or language." CONSTITUTION 1993, supra note 5, ch. 3 (South
African Charter of Fundamental Rights) § 8(2). Section 32 provides in part: "Every
person shall have the right (a) to basic education and to equal access to educational
institutions." Id. § 32(a).
13' See Motala, 1995 SACLR LEXIS 256, at *20.
132 See id. at *22-23.
133 Expressio unius [est] exclusio alterius is "[a] maxim of statutory interpretation
meaning that the expression of one thing is the exclusion of another." BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 581 (6th ed. 1990).
13 See Motala, 1995 SACLR LEXIS 256, at *23.
135 See id.
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parliamentary supremacy. 3 6 Given that this was a predominant
purpose, the court inferred that the framers of the Constitution
could not have "contemplated that the courts would leave it to the
legislator to pass legislation aimed at bringing the common law
into conformity with Chapter 3.'  The court determined that the
framers "intended to make the Courts the custodians of those
rights.' 3'  Through this combined holistic'39 and purposive'"
approach to constitutional interpretation, the court concluded that
at least some provisions of the Bill of Rights were capable of
horizontal application.
14 1
The Bophuthatswana Supreme Court considered the issue of
horizontal application of the Bill of Rights in a factual context
similar to that of Motala. In Baloro v. University of
Bophuthatswana,42 the plaintiffs sought to challenge the
university's new employment policy which, the plaintiff argued,
intentionally discriminated against non-nationals.' Although the
defendant denied that the employment policy constituted a
discriminatory practice,'" the defendant also argued that such a
determination would be irrelevant since the Bill of Rights did not
apply horizontally.
45
The court approached the issue by surveying foreign case
law' 4 and focused primarily on United States jurisprudence and
the "state action" doctrine. 47 The court examined the American
136 See id. at *23-24; see supra note 10.
137 Motala, 1995 SACLR LEXIS 256, at *24.
138 Id.
139 The holistic approach to constitutional interpretation involves determining the
meaning of a particular provision by examining the relevant section in relation to the
purpose and meaning of the Constitution as a whole, instead of examining each section
as a separate and independent constituent part. Ed.
140 See supra note 114 for the definition of a purposive approach.
141 See Motala, 1995 SACLR LEXIS 256, at *24-26.
142 1995 (4) SA 197.
143 See id.
144 See id. at 209.
145 See id.
146 See id. at 213-24.
147 See id. at 213-21. The court found this doctrine instructive and identified the
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Constitution and the negotiations and debates that occurred during
its drafting process."' The court noted that the final report of the
Law Commission contained an expression admitting the
possibility of applying the Bill of Rights to entities other than
governmental organs.1 49 The court determined that a joint reading
of sections 75' and 355 compelled the conclusion that the
fundamental rights must also apply to private parties.
5 2
Despite this determination, the court held that horizontal
application was limited and should be qualified in its use. 53 The
court stated that one way to "circumscribe the horizontal
dimension" would be to apply the "state action" doctrine as used
by the United States' courts.5 4  The court then endorsed an
expanded definition of "organ of the State" which required inquiry
into the extent that an entity was "integrated into the structures of
authority in the State.""' Combining the "state action" doctrine
with this expanded notion of "organ of the state," the court found
the University of Bophuthatswana was an organ of the state and its
activities could be challenged as violating provisions of the Bill of
Rights.1
56
IV. Significance of the Case
The issue of the horizontal application of the Bill of Rights
was one of the most important and most controversial issues
pertinent questions that application of the doctrine required as: (1) whether the activity
in question served a public function; (2) whether the government is involved with the
private actor so significantly as to hold the government responsible for conduct of the
private actor; and (3) whether the government can be said to have encouraged the
challenged conduct. See id. at 214.
148 See id. at 226-28.
149 See id. at 228.
150 See supra notes 58, 63.
151 See supra note 67.
152 See Baloro, 1995 (4) SA at 229.
153 See id. at 238.
154 Id. at 239.
155 Id. at 230 (quoting L. M. du Plessis, The Genisis of the Provisions Concerned
with the Application and Interpretation of the Chapter on Fundamental Rights in South
Africa's Transitional Constitution, 4 TYDSKRIF VIR DIE SUID-AFRIKAANSE REG. 709-10
(1994)).
156 See id. at 246-48.
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addressed by the Constitutional Court.157 Due to the magnitude of
the question, the Constitutional Court could have waited until a
case arose in which the issue of horizontal applicability was
central to the outcome of the litigation. However, the Court chose
to invoke its authority under the interim Constitution to address
the issue despite its mootness in relation to the outcome of the
litigation.
The interim Constitution provided for the referral of issues to
the Constitutional Court from the lower courts even when their
determination was not essential to the disposition of the case at
bar. 58 Because the Supreme Court could refer issues it found to be
of public importance, 59  and because decisions of the
Constitutional Court were binding,16° the resolution of an issue not
essential to the disposition of a case could nevertheless constitute
binding precedent under the interim Constitution.
A. How Du Plessis Differs from the Background Law
The majority of the lower courts addressing the issue had
determined that at least some of the provisions of the Bill of
Rights were capable of horizontal application./61 Where the
provisions of the Constitution were ambiguous, these courts had
looked to the purpose behind the Bill of Rights as they related to
the specific individual provisions before them.1 62 These decisions
addressed the issue of horizontal application with respect to the
specific rights embodied in Chapter 3 rather than pronouncing the
entire Bill of Rights horizontally applicable. 63  These decisions
ultimately rested on the determinations that the common law was
inconsistent with the specific right relied on by the defendants in
157 See BASSON, supra note 5, at 15.
118 See CONSTITUTION 1993, supra note 5, ch. 5, § 102(8).
159 See id.
16 See id. sec. 98(4).
161 See supra notes 79-156 and accompanying text for this Note's treatment of
background law.
162 See, e.g., Holomisa v. Argus Newspapers Ltd., 1996 (2) SA 588; see supra
notes 100-05 and accompanying text.
163 See, e.g., id. (considering section 15's right to freedom of speech and press).
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the respective cases.'"
In contrast, in Du Plessis the Constitutional Court held that the
Bill of Rights was only indirectly horizontally applicable. 5 The
Court made this determination in regard to the entire Bill of
Rights, rather than to any specific individual provision.'66 In
reaching its decision, the Court essentially took an "all-or-nothing"
approach, holding that "Chapter 3 does not have a general direct
horizontal application. '' 67 This "all-or-nothing" approach was
necessary because the provisions that the Court ultimately found
dispositive applied to the entire Constitution and to the entire
content of Chapter 3I68 The Court could not have logically held
only certain provisions of Chapter 3 capable of direct horizontal
application based on its reading of the relevant provisions.'69 The
Court's interpretation of its jurisdiction and the perceived
repercussions that would result from direct application
7 1
foreclosed a more selective approach that would have focused on
the individual articles of Chapter 3.'7'
Nevertheless, the Court's opinion seemed to impeach its own
logic when it clarified the use of the word "general" in its holding:
"I insert the qualification 'general' because it may be open to a
litigant in another case to argue that some particular provision of
Chapter 3 must by necessary implication have a direct horizontal
application.' ' 72 This qualification is problematic. For example, if
found in a U.S. Supreme Court opinion, the statement would
arguably have been dictum because the Court was not presented
with a concrete issue implicating such a qualification. However,
in Du Plessis the Court denominated the word 'general' a
164 See, e.g., id; supra notes 108-09 and accompanying text.
165 See Du Plessis v. De Klerk, 1996 (5) BCLR 658 (CC), 1996 SACLR LEXIS 1,
at *104 (May 15, 1996).
166 See id.
167 Id. at *108.
168 See CONSTITUTION 1993, supra note 5, §§ 4, 7, 33, 35, 36, 98.
169 See Du Plessis, 1996 SACLR LEXIS 1, at *77-94.
170 See id. at *97.
11 See id. at *96-97.
172 Id. at *108.
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qualification to. its holding.' The argument that the statement is
central to the holding is bolstered by section 102(8), which
provided for the determination of issues not necessary for
resolution of the dispute.
7 4
The Court's qualification may also prove problematic when
the lower courts attempt to decide future cases in which direct
horizontal application is asserted by one of the parties. The
holding in Du Plessis created a presumption against direct
horizontal application while at the same time the Court's
qualification rendered the presumption rebuttable.'75 This result
was foreshadowed by the Court's recognition that if the Bill of
Rights was directly horizontally applicable, numerous provisions
"could and would be invoked in private litigation."'76  In the end,
the lower courts were left in no better position with regard to the
horizontal applicability of Chapter 3 than before the Court reached
its decision in Du Plessis. 1
77
Another problem presented by the Court's decision concerns
indirect horizontal application, which was ultimately endorsed by
the Court.7 7 The Court's explanation lacked clarity because
having to "resort to section 35(3) is likely to create even more
uncertainty, as the phrase 'hav[ing] due regard' is surely a vague
concept and 'spirit, purpose and objects' no less so.""' For
example, while a litigant may always invoke a provision of the
173 See id.
'14 See CONSTITUTION 1993, supra note 5, ch. 5, § 102(8).
175 SeeDu Plessis, 1996 SACLR LEXIS 1, at *108.
176 Id. at *96.
177 See Mandela v. Falati, 1994 (4) BCLR 1 (W), 1994 SACLR LEXIS 290, at
*16 (Sept. 8, 1994); Gardener v. Whitaker, 1994 (5) BCLR 19 (E), 1994 SACLR LEXIS
284, at *35 (Nov. 11, 1994); Holomisa v. Argus Newspapers Ltd., 1996 (2) SA 588,
598; Motala v. Univ. of Natal, 1995 (3) BCLR 374 (D), 1995 SACLR LEXIS 256 (Feb.
24, 1995); Baloro v. Univ. of Bophuthatswana, 1995 (4) SA 197 (A), 226-28.
178 See Du Plessis, 1996 SACLR LEXIS 1, at *104.
179 Id. at * 190 (Kriegler, J., dissenting). The dissent pointed out that a "reading
of the Constitution [allowing for horizontal application] avoids jurisprudential and
practical conundrums inherent in the vertical, but indirectly horizontally irradiating
interpretation." Id. at *198 (Kriegler, J., dissenting). Furthermore, allowing horizontal
application would spare the Constitutional Court "the jurisprudential gymnastics forced
on some courts abroad." Id. at * 199 (Kriegler, J., dissenting).
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Constitution against an organ of the government and can argue in
private litigation that a statute relied upon by another litigant is
unconstitutional,18 a private litigant in a private litigation may not
challenge common law rules as unconstitutional.'81 The Court felt
this result was necessary due to the restriction on the Court's
jurisdiction; reasoning that if private litigants could invoke
constitutional issues, every case could potentially be appealed to
the Constitutional Court, which had no jurisdiction under the
interim Constitution to alter the common law. 82 Yet the Court
also found that the Supreme Court, according to section 35, must
"have due regard to the spirit, purport, and objects"'18 3 of Chapter 3
when developing the common law'14 and that "[t]he Constitutional
Court has jurisdiction to determine what the 'spirit, purport and
objects' of Chapter 3 are and to ensure that, in developing the
common law, the other courts have had 'due regard' thereto."'85 It
is difficult to see how this result remedies the potential for conflict
with the Court's restricted jurisdiction in terms of the common
law. Presumably litigants could appeal, albeit with the indirect
assertion that the lower court did not "have due regard" for the
Constitution, rather than with the direct assertion that a common
law rule violated one or more constitutional provisions.
"Indirect horizontal application" as endorsed by the
Constitutional Court eludes precise definition, even though the
Court expressly sought to base its interpretation on a German
model.'86 As the Court explained, "[p]rivate law is therefore to be
developed and interpreted in the light of any applicable
constitutional norm, and continues to govern disputes between
litigants,"'8 7 and "that it [i]s for the ordinary courts to apply the
constitutional norms to private law."'88  This explanation lacks
180 See id. at *85.
181 See id. at *109.
182 See id. at *97.
183 CONSTITUTION 1993, supra note 5, ch. 3, § 35.
184 See Du Plessis, 1996 SACLR LEXIS 1, at * 110.
185 Id.
186 See id. at *71-73.
187 Id. at *72.
188 Id.
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reference to any discernible method of practical application. It is
clear from the opinion that the common law is not to be developed
by "striking down" rules of common law'89 and that the common
law is to be developed incrementally.'" Beyond that, it is difficult
to see what "indirect" means. Is the application indirect as long as
the judge considers constitutional issues sua sponte and not upon
request of the parties? Are the parties not permitted to plead
infringement of constitutional rights by actions of the other party if
those actions accord with applicable common law rules? The
Court managed to clarify the role of the judge somewhat when it
approved of the process followed by the court in Holomisa;
however, the Court never clearly demarcated "direct" and
"indirect" application.
B. Differences in the New Constitution
While Du Plessis introduced uncertainty into the role of the
lower courts when applying the Bill of Rights, any resulting
confusion may be short-lived. The new Constitution contains
different provisions than those in the interim Constitution that
were determinative in the Du Plessis decision. Although a
complete survey of the changes made in the new Constitution and
the reasons for these changes is beyond the scope of this Note, the
provisions which correspond to those factoring in the Du Plessis
decision merit review. The supremacy clause of the new
Constitution provides that "law or conduct inconsistent with [the
Constitution] is invalid," '191 while the interim Constitution used the
words "law or act inconsistent with [a Constitutional]
provision."'' The substitution of the word "conduct" for the word
"act" may very well be significant because "act" is capable of
being interpreted as "legislative act." It is difficult to see how
"conduct" will be limited to legislative "acts" in the future.
The 1996 Constitution also contains the provision that the Bill
of Rights binds the judiciary.' 93 The corresponding provision in
189 Id. at*101.
190 See id. at*100-01.
191 CONSTITUTION 1996, supra note 5, ch. 1, § 2.
192 CONSTITUTION 1993, supra note 5, ch. 1, § 4.
193 CONSTITUION 1996, supra note 5, ch. 2, § 8(1).
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the interim Constitution, much relied on by the Court in Du
Plessis, provided only that the Bill of Rights "shall bind all
legislative and executive organs of state at all levels of
government."'94 Additionally, the interim Constitution provided
that "juristic persons" would be entitled to Chapter 3 rights and
was silent regarding whether or not they were bound by the Bill of
Rights. 9 The 1996 Constitution provides that juristic and natural
persons are both entitled to and are bound by the rights guaranteed
in the Bill of Rights. 96 With respect to the Constitutional Court's
jurisdiction relative to that of the Appellate Division of the
Supreme Court, the new Constitution does not deprive the
Appellate Division of jurisdiction over constitutional matters, as
did the interim Constitution. 97 However, the Constitutional Court
retains its jurisdiction to decide "issues connected with decisions
on constitutional matters."'98  These provisions substantively
change the provisions of the interim Constitution on the perceived
"jurisdictional divide" which factored in the Du Plessis Court's
decision.
The most significant provisions of the new Constitution
regarding the issue of horizontal application are those which give
the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court jurisdiction to hear
constitutional issues' 99 and which cause the Bill of Rights to have
binding effect with respect to natural and juristic persons.' o
Because the Appellate Division can now hear and decide
constitutional issues, subject only to an appeal to the
Constitutional Court,"' the Du Plessis Court's analytical emphasis
on the jurisdictional incompetence of, and jurisdictional division
between, the two courts loses most of its force. An argument
against direct horizontal application can no longer be predicated
on the Appellate Division's incompetence to hear constitutional
194 See CONSTITUTION 1993, supra note 5, ch. 3, § 7(1).
195 Id. § 7(3).
196 See CONSTITUTION 1996, supra note 5, ch. 2, § 8.
197 See id. ch. 8, § 168(3).
198 Id. ch. 8, § 167(3)(b).
199 See id. ch. 8, § 168(3).
200 See id. ch. 2, § 8(2).
201 See id. ch. 8, § 167(3)(a).
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issues. However, the second prong of the jurisdictional divide-
the Constitutional Court's incompetence to develop the common
law-has not been resolved by the new Constitution.22  Because
the Constitutional Court's own limitations weighed heavily in the
majority's opinion in Du Plessis,0 3 this provision of the
Constitution, absent additional changes, should have little effect
on the holding in Du Plessis.
The second change, the one altering the binding effect of the
Bill of Rights on natural and juristic persons, may constitute new
evidence of the framers' intentions regarding horizontal
application. One significant section is the provision that natural
and juristic persons are bound by Chapter 3.204 Even more
significant, in terms of horizontal application, are the limitations
placed on the binding effect of Chapter 3 .205 Natural and juristic
persons are bound "if, and to the extent that, [a provision] is
applicable, taking into account the nature of the right and of any
duty imposed by the right."2 6 This provision appears to endorse
the provision-specific approach that the lower courts took when
applying the Bill of Rights2 7 rather than the "all-or-nothing"
approach taken by the Constitutional Court.2 8
This provision does not address the "direct" versus "indirect"
application issue. Section 8(3) touches on this issue implicitly by
providing limited guidance to the courts when applying the Bill of
Rights to private persons. 2° This provision apparently endorses an
indirect application because a court must "apply, or where
necessary, develop, the common law to the extent that legislation
does not give effect to that right; and may develop rules of the
202 See CONSTITUTION 1996, supra note 5, ch. 8, § 167(3)( c).
203 See Du Plessis v. De Klerk, 1996 (5) BCLR 658, 1996 SACLR LEXIS 1, at
*97 (May 15, 1996).
204 See CONSTITUTION 1996, supra note 5, ch. 2, § 8(2).
205 See id.
206 Id.
207 See supra notes 79-156 and accompanying text for this Note's treatment of
background law.
208 See Du Plessis v. De Klerk, 1996 (5) BCLR 658 (CC), 1996 SACLR LEXIS 1,
at *77-94 (May 15, 1996).
209 See CONSTITUTION 1996, supra note 5, ch. 2, § 8(3).
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common law to limit the right, provided that the limitation is in
accordance with section 36(l). " "21 While this provision does not
forbid other approaches to the application of the Bill to private
party disputes, it does appear to express the indirect application
endorsed by the Court in Du Plessis.' Certainly it falls short of
the express, clear statement of direct horizontal application that the
Court stated it would have expected to find if such an application
were intended." Given the language of section 8 and the Du
Plessis standard for the language that would indicate direct
application was intended, section 8 seems to settle the issue in
favor of indirect application.213 Based on this language it would
also seem that Du Plessis remains good law under the new
Constitution, although the issue of horizontal application may
need to be revisited to establish this result conclusively.
V. Conclusion
Although Du Plessis could have been decided without the
resolution of the issue of horizontal application of the Bill of
Rights,214 the Court reached the issue upon request of the Supreme
Court pursuant to section 102(8).215 The holding was unnecessary
because the case was already determined and because the new
Constitution had already been adopted and would soon come into
force.216
When the Court held that the Bill of Rights was capable of
indirect horizontal application but not general direct application,2 7
it injected an unnecessary measure of confusion into the role of the
lower courts regarding the application of Chapter 3 rights and the
210 Id. Section 36 corresponds to section 33 in the interim Constitution. See
CONSTITUTION 1993, supra note 5, ch. 3, § 33.
211 See CONSTITUTION 1996, supra note 5, ch. 2, § 8(2). See also Du Plessis, 1996
SACLR LEXIS 1, at *100.
212 See Du Plessis, 1996 SACLR LEXIS 1, at *80-81.
213 See CONSTITUTION 1996, supra note 5, ch. 2, § 8(3).
214 See Du Plessis, 1996 SACLR LEXIS 1, at *57.
215 See CONSTITUTION 1996, supra note 5, ch. 5, § 102(8).
216 See id. ch. 14, § 244(1).
217 See Du Plessis, 1996 SACLR LEXIS 1, at *108.
1997] 1035
N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG.
development of the common law.21 The holding was confusing
because it did nothing to clarify the process by which the lower
courts were to apply constitutional norms. Even more confusing
was the Court's determination that its own jurisdictional
limitations precluded direct horizontal application of the entire
interim Constitution, while recognizing that there might be
instances in which direct application would be necessary by the
terms of a specific provision. Furthermore, the Court's concern
that direct horizontal application would open the door for all
private litigation to reach the Constitutional Court cannot be
reconciled with the Court's recognition that litigants may seek
indirect horizontal application through appeals to the
Constitutional Court on the ground that the lower court failed to
"[give] due regard for the spirit, purport, and objects" of Chapter
3. Presumably, this holding would have also allowed all private
litigation to ultimately reach the Constitutional Court as well.
While the terms of the new Constitution vary from those of the
interim Constitution, the confusion introduced by Du Plessis is not
totally erased by the changes in the relevant provisions considered
by the Court. Section 8 apparently resolves the issue in favor of
indirect application,219 but when read in conjunction with Du
Plessis it does little to clarify how the lower courts are to apply the
provisions under indirect horizontal application.220
When the horizontal applicability issue is revisited, the Court
must clear up the confusion it introduced regarding the extent of
its own jurisdiction to develop the common law and answer the
question of how far the Court can extend its jurisdiction over the
common law in order to determine whether the lower courts have
had "due regard for the spirit, purport, and objects" of Chapter
3?221 The Court must also address the question of how this
approach differs from taking appeals that directly assert a violation
218 See id. at * 190 (Kriegler, J., dissenting).
219 See id. ch. 2, § 8(3).
220 See id.
221 See CONSTITUTION 1993, supra note 5, ch. 3, § 35(3). The corresponding
section in the new Constitution provides that "[the] tribunal or forum must promote the
spirit, purport, and objects of the Bill of Rights." CONSTITUTION 1996, supra note 5, ch.
2, § 39 (emphasis added).
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of the Constitution by a common law rule in terms of the scope of
permissible common law development by the Constitutional
Court? These issues must be addressed in order for the lower
courts to know their jurisdiction and which issues can only be
addressed on appeal.
Additionally, the Court must clarify the role of the lower
courts in developing the common law since the new Constitution
mandates such development.222 Can the lower courts accept
pleadings which directly attack rules of the common law on
grounds that such rules or actions are unconstitutional? Are the
courts limited to "incremental 2 23 rather than more dramatic
change? How are competing rights to be balanced in terms of
sections 8224 and 36225 to ensure "due regard for the spirit, purport,
.and objects" of Chapter 3?226 While resolution of these issues was
not necessary to the Du Plessis Court's determination that Chapter
3 is only indirectly horizontally applicable, it would seem that
their resolution is necessary to guide the lower courts in their
indirect horizontal application to private disputes of the Bill of
Rights under the new Constitution. The lower courts must now
await a Du Plessis Part II to settle these questions.
DELISA FUTCH
222 See CoNsTITrloN 1996, supra note 5, ch. 2, § 8(3).
223 See Du Plessis v. De Klerk, 1996 (5) BCLR 658, 1996 SACLR LEXIS 1, at
* 106 (May 15, 1996).
224 See supra notes 205-11 and accompanying text.
225 Section 36 provides:
(1) The rights in the Bill of Rights may be limited only in terms of law of
general application to the extent that the limitation is reasonable and justifiable
in an open and democratic society based on human dignity, equality and
freedom, taking into account all relevant factors including-(a) the nature of the
right; (b) the importance of the purpose of the limitation; (c) the nature and
extent of the limitation; (d) the relation between the limitation and its purpose;
and (e) less restrictive means to achieve the purpose.
CONSTITUTION 1996, supra note 5, ch. 2, § 36.
226 See BASSON, supra note 5, at 16.
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